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Contact LSE Research Online at: Library.Researchonline@lse.ac.ukTHE POLITICS OF PUBLIC PROVISION OF EDUCATION1
Gilat Levy
Public provision of education is usually viewed as a form of redistribution in kind.
However, does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as well? I analyze a two-
dimensional model of political decision-making with endogenous political parties. Society
chooses both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between income redistribution
and public education. Agents diﬀer in their income and in their age, where young agents
prefer public education and the old prefer income redistribution. I ﬁnd that when the cohort
size of the young is not too large then public education arises as a political compromise
between the rich and the young segment of the poor. They collude in order to reduce the
size of government (which beneﬁts the rich) and target some of its resources to education
(which beneﬁts the young poor). When the cohort size of the young is too large however,
income redistribution crowds out public provision of education in the political equilibrium.
I. Introduction
Economists have long been puzzled by the question of public provision of private goods,
such as education.2 In the normative literature, the reasons that are put forward for gov-
ernment intervention in the provision of education are externalities or other market failures
such as imperfect information. In the positive literature though, public provision of edu-
cation is viewed as a form of redistribution. For example, Epple and Romano [1996a] or
Glomm and Ravikumar [1998] view it as redistribution from the rich to the poor since the
poor do not have enough means to ﬁnance private education.3 In the context of high edu-
cation, Fernández and Rogerson [1995] show that public provision of education is actually
redistribution from the poor to the rich, where the former are ﬁnancially constrained from
1 I thank Tim Besley who suggested to me to work on this problem. Oriana Bandiera, Tim Besley,
Raquel Fernández, Valentino Larcinese, Michele Piccione, Ronny Razin, the editor Robert Barro and two
anonymous referees provided helpful comments. I also thank the Sapir center for development for ﬁnancial
support.
2 Other examples are health care, police protection or refuse collection. For an argument why education
should be considered as a private and not a public good, see Barzel [1973].
3 This is also the view in the normative work of Besley and Coate [1991].
1attending universities. Gradstein and Kaganovich [2003] perceive public education as re-
distribution from the old (who do not beneﬁt from education) to the young (whose future
income is positively correlated with education).
All these papers analyze models in which the unique possible form of redistribution
available to society is redistribution in kind, i.e., public provision of education. However,
income redistribution may be a more eﬃcient tool for shifting resources from one group
of voters to the other, so that it can substitute for redistribution in kind while creating a
Pareto improvement. By disregarding income redistribution as a possible policy tool, these
descriptive models may predict an excessive level of public provision of education.
This paper engages in a positive analysis of public provision of education. In keeping
with previous literature, I assume that governments may engage in education provision
in order to redistribute resources (speciﬁcally, from the old to the young). In contrast to
previous literature however, I allow society to use income redistribution as an additional
policy tool. Society chooses in the model both the size of the government and how to allocate
its resources between public provision of education and income redistribution. Questions
that arise in this context are as follows. When income redistribution is feasible, is education
publicly provided as well? What are the factors determining the level of public provision of
education? For example, how is it related to income inequality or to demography parameters
such as cohort size of school age children? Also, what is the size of government when society
can choose both the size of government and how to target its resources? These are the
questions I address in the paper.
I analyze a two-dimensional political economy model. Agents in the model are diﬀer-
entiated according to their income. The ﬁrst conﬂict in society is therefore on the tax rate
and pits the rich against the poor (whom I assume constitute a majority of the population),
with the poor pushing for maximum taxation. Agents are also diﬀerentiated according to
their age with young voters beneﬁting more from education relative to old voters. This
can arise for example because education has a positive eﬀect on future income which the
old cannot capture.4 Young voters are the ones that actually consume education and as in
Epple and Romano [1996a], they can top up their consumption of public education by buy-
4 Empirically, old voters are indeed shown to be less supportive of education spending relative to young
voters (e.g., voters with school age children) which indicates that they beneﬁt less from it. See Koretz [1995],
Rubinfeld [1977] and Button [1992].
2ing private education. The second conﬂict in society pits therefore the young who support
public provision of education against the old who prefer income redistribution (given the
same size of government).
The tax rate and the level of public spending on education are determined by a political
process. The political model follows the one in Levy [2004] and has realistic institutional
features; it allows both for endogenous entry of politicians and for endogenous political
parties. In this model, parties choose which platforms to oﬀer (if at all), where each platform
speciﬁes the tax rate and how much of the budget will be spent on public education. An
important feature of the model is that parties can only oﬀer credible platforms, that is,
policies in the Pareto set of their members. Given the platforms that are oﬀered, voters
cast their vote for the platform they like most and the political outcome is the platform
which attracts the largest number of votes. Parties are also endogenous in the sense that
given the political outcome, members do not wish to split from their party (and possibly
induce a diﬀerent political outcome). The equilibrium analysis pins down the composition of
political parties as well as the level of public education, private education, income transfers
and the total size of government.
The main results are as follows. First, I ﬁnd that whether public education arises in
equilibrium even when income redistribution is feasible, depends negatively on the cohort
size of the young. Speciﬁcally, when the young are a minority in the population then there is
relatively high level of per capita public provision of education whereas when the young are
a majority, then income redistribution crowds out public provision of education. Second, I
show that even though the poor are a majority, the political outcome does not prescribe the
maximum tax level. The rich manage to take advantage of the divergent views among the
poor with regard to how to spend tax revenues in order to reduce the size of government.
Third, the winning parties are always composed of rich representatives and representatives
from the minority segment of the poor - either the young or the old.
To see the intuition for these results, consider ﬁrst the case when the old are a majority.
In this case, the old segment of the poor represents majoritarian interests. The old poor
would advocate a policy of maximum taxation, equal income for all, and no public education.
However, when the old are a majority, it is also the case that public education would be
consumed only by the few - the young. This implies that public education is relatively cheap
in the sense that even a low tax rate can provide a generous per capita level of education.
3Thus, the rich and the young segment of the poor can form a party which can credibly oﬀer
a policy that is better for both factions relative to the majoritarian policy of maximum
taxation and no public education. Such policy reduces the tax burden but shifts resources
to public education. This policy breaks the cohesiveness of the majority of the old voters
(by rewarding the rich segment of the old with relatively high income) and as a result can
win the election. Public education arises then in equilibrium as a political compromise
between the rich who want low taxes, and the poor segment of the young voters who cannot
aﬀord to buy satisfactory level of education privately.
On the other hand, when the young voters are a majority, it is the young poor who
represent majoritarian interests, advocating maximum taxation as well as high levels of
public provision of education. However, when the young constitute a large proportion of
society it also becomes expensive to provide signiﬁcant levels of public education per capita.
The rich would view it as an ineﬃcient form of redistribution. The rich can then turn to
form a winning coalition with the old segment of the poor. This coalition’s policy would
reduce the tax rate and shift tax revenues towards income redistribution. Thus, when
income redistribution is feasible, public education may not be provided in equilibrium if the
young are a majority.
As far as private education is concerned, I ﬁnd that the rich and the poor are more
likely to be equally educated when the young are a minority. In this case both the rich
and the poor may consume only public education (which is generously provided) and are
therefore educated at the same level. On the other hand when the young are a majority
public provision of education is relatively low so that both income groups are likely to
consume private education. But since the tax rate is not the maximum one, inequality of
income persists in equilibrium. The rich have therefore more resources to invest in education
and become more educated than the poor in this case.
Lastly, I show how the winning policies are aﬀected by the level of income inequality.
In the model, income inequality determines how cohesive are the diﬀerent rich groups, the
young and the old (where high income inequality increases their cohesiveness). Interestingly,
the eﬀect of this on the political outcome depends on demography as well. I ﬁnd that when
the young are a minority, higher income inequality (and hence more cohesive rich groups)
may increase both tax rates and public education. When the young are a majority on the
other hand, higher income inequality may decrease tax rates. Thus, higher income inequality
4may result in a diﬀerent income distribution starting from a diﬀerent age distribution.
Currently there are no papers which look at these integrated predictions of both the
nature of political parties and their economic policies but the model can shed some light on
other ﬁndings in the literature. Lindert [1996] looks at both welfare transfers and education
expenditure in OECD countries in the years 1960-1981. He ﬁnds that the level of social
spending is primarily governed by the relative sizes of age groups in the population and
by income distribution. In particular, he ﬁnds that a larger cohort of school age children
decreases educational spending per child and that an increase in the cohort size of young
adults (ages 20 to 39) has increased welfare (as well as pensions, a spending which favours
the old), in accordance with my results. Finally, the cohort size of those over 65 increased
welfare and pensions up to a point in which larger group size implied negative returns per
recipient. My model suggests an explicit political mechanism in which group size has such
diminishing returns.
The rest of the literature does not look at the eﬀect of age groups on both welfare and
education. Still, as in the OECD countries above, both Poterba [1997] and Case, Hines and
Rosen [1993] ﬁnd strong negative eﬀect of student cohort size (children aged 5 to 17) on
spending per pupil in state expenditures in the United States.
In terms of the eﬀect of the share of the elderly on redistributive policies, the empirical
results are not as conclusive. Poterba [1997] ﬁnds that the size of the cohort of old citizens
has a negative eﬀect on education spending. However, this eﬀe c tw a sn o ts t a t i s t i c a l l y
signiﬁcant when urban population was included in the regression. Case, Hines and Rosen
[1993] ﬁnd that a larger proportion of elderly residents reduces per capita expenditures on
both expenditures which favour the young such as education and expenditures which favor
the old such as health. Additional empirical studies on the eﬀect of the cohort size of the
old on education spending at the county and the municipality level produce mixed results.5
The theoretical literature on public provision of education (when there is also a private
option) was pioneered by Stiglitz [1974]. Since his work, the literature has focused on
whether a median voter result exists in a one-dimensional model in which all tax revenues
are targeted to public provision of education.6 My paper provides an analytical analysis of
5 Ladd and Murry [2001] and Harris et al [2001] ﬁnd that the elderly have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
public education in the United States. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly [1999] ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the elderly
share on education spending per pupil in U.S. municipalities.
6 See Epple and Romano [1996a,1996b], Gloom and Ravikumar [1998], Fernández and Rogerson [1995]
5a two-dimensional model in which society simultaneously chooses the tax rate and how to
divide its revenues between income redistribution and public education; the preferences on
the induced policy space are single-peaked and since I explicitly model political institutions,
the model yields stable political outcomes despite being two-dimensional.
Another focus of the literature on public education is whether the political outcomes
accord with the views of the majority. Both in Epple and Romano [1996b] and Fernández
and Rogerson [1995], a voting coalition of an ‘ends against the middle’ arises between the
rich and the poor (who vote against the middle class). This results in a political outcome
which is not the preferred choice of the voter with the median income. In my analysis,
outcomes are non-majoritarian as well; the coalition that arises between the rich and the
poor however is not against the middle but against the ‘expensive’ segment of the poor.
Roemer [1998] also shows that the poor do not expropriate the rich when the policy
space is two-dimensional. In his model, agents diﬀer in their income and in their preferences
on a non-economic dimension (religion); he therefore does not address the issue of education
or more generally redistribution in kind.7 In my model, the two conﬂicts in society are tied
through a budget constraint. This is why I can identify the negative cohort size eﬀect with
respect to public education.
Finally, Fernández and Levy [2005] also analyze the trade-oﬀ between general redistri-
bution and targeted transfers. In that paper, however, we focus on goods that are explicitly
targeted to many small interest groups, such as local public goods, and study the eﬀect of
diversity in society (the probability that two individuals belong to the same interest group)
on redistribution. In contrast, here I analyze targeted goods that aﬀect large segments of
society and hence can have a negative cohort size eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the model.
The main results about public education versus income redistribution are in Section III.
Section IV discusses some extensions and the main assumptions of the model. I conclude
in section V. All formal proofs are in a companion working paper, Levy (2005).
II. The Model
and Austen-Smith [2003]. Bearse, Glomm and Janeba [2001] show that the median voter result fails when
the tax rate is ﬁxed but voters decide between income redistribution and public education.
7 See also Austen-Smith and Wallerstein [2003], who analyze a model in which the poor are divided on
the level of aﬃrmative action.
6II.A. The Economic Environment
Preferences and feasible policies: There are four groups of agents in the economy,
distinguished by their income and according to their preferences for education. I ﬁrst
describe how agents are diﬀerentiated on the latter issue.
There are two types of goods, a numeraire good denoted by x which all agents like,
and education, denoted by e, t o w a r d sw h i c ha g e n t sh a v ed i ﬀerent attitudes. Iu s et h el a b e l s
"young" and "old" to distinguish between those who like education and those who have
less aﬃnity for education. Education is traditionally seen as a spending which favours the
young, due to its positive eﬀect on future income or social capital, which the old cannot
capture. Empirically, old voters are shown to be less supportive of education spending
compared with young voters, which indicates that they beneﬁt less from education.8 The
young/old distinction can also be correlated with whether voters have school age children
or not and how much they care for their children’s education or future income.9
I assume that the utility function of the young voters, u(e,x), is strictly increasing in
both elements, strictly concave and twice diﬀerentiable. Both education and the numeraire
are assumed to be normal goods.10 These assumptions are general enough and can capture
for example the idea that the amount of education consumed when young aﬀects future
income. Thus, the utility function of the young can be interpreted as a reduced form of a
utility function in a two-period model, where agents enjoy present income or consumption
of the numeraire good as well as future income, which increases in present consumption of
education. To keep matters simple, I analyze a static model. The results are robust however
to a dynamic extension, which I discuss in section IV.A.
The old voters, on the other hand, only care about the numeraire good and for sim-
plicity their utility function is linear in x. The extreme assumption that old voters do not
beneﬁt at all from education is not important; it simpliﬁes substantially the calculations
8 Koretz [1995] shows that support for public schooling declines from 77 percent if the respondent is
under 30 to 47 percent if the respondent is above 70. See also Rubinfeld [1977].
9 In particular, we can think of young voters as those who have school age children and altruistically
care about their education. Stromberg [2000] has shown that indeed it is young adults between the ages of
18 to 44 who represent children’s interests when voting (this age group probably accounts for parents with
school age children). Since the degree of altruism decreases with generational distance, old voters care less
about grandchildren’s education.
10 The assumptions about the utility function and the goods being normal goods are not all necessary
but simplify matters.
7of the political outcome, but the qualitative results remain even if the old were to beneﬁt
from education somewhat (for example, through education externalities). Lastly, I assume
that only young voters consume education. This assumption is again not necessary and the
results hold if one assumes that the old consume public education at a suﬃciently low level
(I discuss the diﬀerent assumptions about the young and the old in section IV.B).
Agents are also diﬀerentiated according to their income. There are two levels of income
in the economy. The poor have income wl and the rich have income wh >w l. The four
groups in the population are then the old rich (ro), the young rich (ry), the old poor (po),
and the young poor (py). The share of the poor in the population is π (for simplicity there
is no correlation between income and the preferences for education and therefore the share
of the poor is the same among the young and among the old). The average income w is
therefore
w = πwl +( 1− π)wh.
Society has to choose a tax level t ∈ [0,1]. Tax revenues can ﬁnance either an income
transfer in a lump sum way to the whole population, denoted by T ≥ 0 per capita, or the
provision of education, denoted by g ≥ 0 per capita (a larger investment in education can
be interpreted as increasing its quality).11 The price of education in terms of the numeraire
x is q. Denote the share of the young in the economy by θ ∈ (0,1). For simplicity, taxation
is not distortionary and hence the budget constraint per capita is
tw = T + θqg.
Thus, income redistribution can be viewed as a transfer from the rich to the poor
whereas public education, if provided, can be interpreted as a transfer of resources from the
old to the young, since the latter are those who consume education.
As in the ‘top up’ model of Epple and Romano [1996a], young voters may also supple-
ment the public provision of education by buying education in the market, through private
tutors for example, for the same price q. I show in the proofs that the price q has no eﬀect
on the results and hence I normalize it to q =1 . Denote the additional consumption of
education by s.
The parameters of the model are therefore π,θ,wh,w and the utility function of the
11 I therefore ﬁx the system of public education ﬁnance. See Fernández and Richardson [2003] for a
recent analysis of diﬀerent ﬁnance systems of (local) public education.
8young. I focus the analysis on the case of the poor being the majority, that is, π>1
2. Also,
for the sake of interest, assume that none of the four groups composes a majority in the
population.
The political variables that are chosen by society, given these parameters, are t, T
and g; these choices will be determined through a political process, which I describe later
on. It will sometimes be more convenient to describe policy in terms of the net income
transfer from the rich to the poor, denoted by I, I ≡ T − twl. Finally, note that given the
budget constraint I = t(w − wl) − θg, the 3-dimensional policy problem of choosing t,g,
and I reduces to a problem of choosing a two-dimensional policy, (t,g). The policy space is




Ideal policies and induced preferences: I now characterize the ideal policies and indif-
ference curves of the diﬀerent groups in society, in the policy space (t,g).T h e o l d a r e
indiﬀerent between all policies that provide them with the same income. This implies, for
wi ∈ {wl,w h} :







The indiﬀerence curves of the old are therefore linear, with a positive slope for the poor
and a negative slope for the rich. Figure I depicts the indiﬀerence curves of ro and po in the
policy space. It is also easy to see from Figure I that the ideal policy of ro is (t =0 ,g=0 ) ,
and that of po is at (t =1 ,g=0 ) , i.e., the old poor’s ideal policy is equality of income with
I = w − wl.
Figure II describes the indiﬀerence curves of the young in the (t,g) space. To under-
stand the shape of the indiﬀerence curves, note that given some (t,g), each young household
chooses how much private education s to buy, i.e., they choose s ≥ 0 to maximize
u(g + s, wi + t(w − wi) − θg − s).
When g is relatively low both the young rich and the young poor need to supplement
it by buying private education (s>0 in the optimal solution). This implies that when g is
suﬃciently low, any additional transfer of g is seen as a pure money subsidy and substitutes
private consumption. As a result, the indiﬀerence curves are linear for low values of g. When
g is high enough there is no need in private education (that is, s =0 ) . The indiﬀerence
curves become concave (given the strict quasi-concavity of u).
9In terms of ideal policies the young poor obviously prefer the highest tax level, t =1 ,
and only have to consider how to divide it between public provision of education and an
income transfer. Both are viewed by the young poor as transfers from other groups in
society to themselves. Denote by g∗(1) their optimal level of public education given t =1 .
The young rich, ry, clearly prefer not to redistribute any income. But, as opposed to
the old rich, they view public provision of education favorably, since this is a transfer from
the old to the young. If the size of the cohort of young voters (θ)i sr e l a t i v e l yl o wo ri f
income inequality is low then such redistribution is beneﬁcial for ry (technically, this arises
when the slope of the linear part of their indiﬀerence curve is less steep than society’s budget
constraint). Their ideal policy is therefore (t = t∗,g=
t∗w
θ
) for some t∗ ∈ (0,1). If on the
other hand θ is relatively high or if income inequality is high then it is too costly for ry
to ﬁnance public education, and the young rich prefer no redistribution at all. Their ideal
policy is therefore (0,0). Lemma 1 summarizes the above discussion:
Lemma 1 In the (t,g) policy space:12
(i) The ideal policy of py is (t =1 ,g= g∗(1)) and the ideal policy of ry is (t =0 ,g=0 )
if θ> w
wh and otherwise it is (t = t∗,g=
t∗w
θ
) for some t∗ ∈ (0,1). The indiﬀerence curves
of ry and py are weakly concave and diﬀerentiable. For all t0 ∈ [0,1], an indiﬀerence curve








(ii) The ideal policy of ro is (t =0 ,g =0 ) , and that of po is (t =1 ,g =0 ). The







In the analysis of the political model described below, I will focus on pure strategy
equilibria. This makes the results more stark but does not change their qualitative nature.
To insure the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in this general economic environment,
I make the following restrictions on the parameters of the utility functions. Let vi(t,g)
denote the (indirect) utility of type i ∈ {po,p y,r o,r y} from a policy (t,g). I assume that
the poor ‘stick’ together, i.e., that po prefers the ideal policy of py to that of ro,a n dt h a t
py prefers the ideal policy of po to that of ry:
Assumption 1 vpy(1,0) = vpy(t∗, t∗w
θ )+δ,and vpo(1,g∗(1)) = vpo(0,0)+µ, where δ ≥ δ0 > 0
and µ ≥ µ0 > 0.δ 0 and µ0 are deﬁned in the appendix.
12 All formal proofs are in a companion working paper, Levy (2005).
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The economic model has constructed a society with four groups of citizens who are
divided on two dimensions, age and income. The political process translates their economic
preferences into a policy outcome, namely the size of government (t) and whether to redis-
tribute income to all or education to the young (g). I adopt the political model of parties
introduced in Levy [2004]. A more detailed and formal description is provided there.
The main assumption about parties in this model is that each party can only oﬀer
credible policies, that is, policies in the Pareto set of its members. Thus, when a politician
runs as an individual candidate he can only oﬀer his ideal policy, as in the ‘citizen candidate’
model.13 On the other hand, when heterogeneous politicians join together in a party, their
Pareto set is larger than the set of their ideal policies. For example, the party of the old
rich and the old poor can oﬀer all policies with g =0and diﬀerent tax rates, t ∈ [0,1]. The
party of the old poor and the young poor can oﬀer t =1and some level of public education
ranging from 0 to g∗(1), and so on. The assumption about parties captures the idea that
parties allow diﬀerent factions to reach (eﬃcient) internal compromises.14
Assume therefore that there are four politicians participating in the political process,
each representing a diﬀerent group of voters. In other words, politician i has the preferences
of group i ∈ {ro,p o,r y,p y}. Consider a partition on the set of politicians. For example,
po|py|ro|ry is the partition in which each politician can only run as an individual candidate,
and the partition popy|ro|ry is such that the poor representatives- young and old -join
together in one party and each of the rich politicians can only run as an individual. Suppose
for now that the partition of politicians into parties is given.
In an election all parties (including one member parties) in this given partition simul-
taneously choose whether to oﬀer a platform and if so, which platform in their Pareto set
to oﬀer. Voters (the whole population) then vote for the platform they like most. The
election’s outcome is the platform which receives the largest number of votes (if winning
platforms tie then each is chosen with equal probability). If no policy is oﬀered, a default
status quo is implemented. For simplicity I assume that the status quo is a situation of
13 See Besley and Coate [1997] and Osborne and Slivinski [1996].
14 The assumption about heterogenous parties relies on the idea that it is relatively easy for a small
group of politicians to monitor one another. The public can then trust promises which represent internal
compromises in the party. See also Ray and Vohra [1997] who analyze a general model in which agreements
within coalitions are binding, as here.
11"chaos" which is worse for all players than any other outcome (alternatively one can assume
that the status quo is simply the policy of no redistribution, i.e., a ‘government shut-down’,
and the analysis would be exactly the same).
In this given partition, a set of platforms is an equilibrium if given the other platforms,
no party can change its action (by withdrawing, oﬀering another platform, or joining the
race) and improve the utility of all its members.15 In addition I assume the following
tie-breaking rule: In equilibrium a party does not oﬀer some platform if, given the other
platforms that are oﬀered, all party members are indiﬀerent between oﬀering this platform
and not running at all. This reﬁnement is reasonable if one considers some small costs
of running (I do not assume such costs explicitly but this assumption will not change the
analysis).
Generically, given a set of platforms, there is only one platform that will receive the
largest number of votes. As I show in the proofs, this together with the tie-breaking rule and
the structure of preferences implies that only one platform is actually oﬀered in equilibrium
and obviously it wins. Thus, for any ﬁxed partition we can ﬁnd the set of such equilibrium
winning platforms. Each such platform belongs to the Pareto set of one of the parties
and there is no other party which can win against it while increasing the utility of all its
members.
Finally, I focus on stable political outcomes, namely, equilibrium winning platforms
which are immune to politicians changing their party membership. Consider a politician
or group of politicians who split from their party, while the rest of the representatives
maintain their party membership. In this new partition, a new set of equilibrium winning
platforms can arise. A stable political outcome is an equilibrium winning platform such that
no politician (or a group of politicians) can break their party and receive a (weakly) higher
utility from some equilibrium winning platform in the new partition.16
Parties are therefore endogenous in the model in the sense that we identify the array
of political parties and political outcomes such that no group of politicians wish to quit
their party. As I show below, endogenous parties (namely, stable coalitions of diﬀerent
representatives) always arise in equilibrium. The prediction of the model is then the set of
stable political outcomes with endogenous parties.
15 For a general deﬁnition of equilibria and proof of existence see Levy [2004].
16 The stability requirement introduced here is simpler than the one in Levy [2004], which is recursive.
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The characterization of stable political outcomes allows us to determine the compo-
sition of the winning coalitions, their tax policies, and how they suggest to divide tax
revenues between income transfers and public education. Furthermore, we can predict how
much private education is consumed (and by who) and how income inequality aﬀects the
winning policies. I now present the main results, about the composition of parties and their
winning policies, whereas the other sections which follow describe the results about private
education and the eﬀect of income inequality. The full characterization of stable political
outcomes is in Lemma 2 in the appendix.
III.A Political Parties and Public Education
The main results uncover a negative cohort size eﬀect with respect to public provision
of education. The cohort size of the young or the old can matter in the model in two
-conﬂicting- ways. On the one hand, a large cohort of old voters may push for income
redistribution if it votes as a bloc; on the other hand, a small cohort of young voters may
be more ﬂexible in making intraparty compromises with other groups. As Proposition 1
shows, the latter eﬀect dominates and allows minorities to be politically successful:
Proposition 1 With endogenous political parties,
(i) When the young are a minority, per capita public provision of education is strictly
higher and per capita net income transfer is strictly lower than when the young are a
majority.
(ii) All stable political outcomes are characterized by a positive but not a maximum
tax rate.
(iii) When the young are a minority, any winning party is composed of the young poor
and some rich representatives (young or old). When the young are a majority, then any
winning party is composed of the old poor and some rich representatives.
The winning coalitions are therefore a combination of minorities: the rich (who are a
minority) and the minority segment of the poor, either the young or the old. As a result,
income redistribution crowds out public education when the young are a majority whereas
public education is generously provided, at the expense of income transfers, when the young
are a minority. Moreover, since some rich representatives are always in the winning coalition,
13the tax level remains relatively low and thus the poor do not fully expropriate the rich in
equilibrium.
To understand the results about the winning coalitions and their policies, let us start
w i t ht h ec a s eo fθ<1




. In this case, income inequality is relatively high, so that the young rich and
the old rich are both against any redistribution and have (0,0) as their ideal policy.
There are two things to note in this environment. First, consider the benchmark case
when no coalitions have formed. This is the partition po|py|ro|ry. In this situation, each
politician can only oﬀer his ideal policy to the voters. It is then easy to see that the unique
equilibrium is that po, the representative of the old poor, wins the election with his ideal
policy, (1,0). To see why he wins, note that if any of the rich representatives challenges
the old poor, they are defeated; the young poor prefer some redistribution to none and
hence vote with the old poor. Since the poor are the majority, the rich cannot win. If the
representative of the young poor challenges the old poor, he is defeated as well. This is
because the old voters, who are the majority, would vote for the old poor since they prefer
income redistribution to public provision of education. The political outcome, when parties
don’t exist, is therefore equal income for all, and no public provision of education.
Second, let us consider how coalitional parties can change this ‘default’ state of aﬀairs.
Consider the partition ropy|po|ry. The party ropy of the old rich and the young poor, can
oﬀer policies in its Pareto set which is depicted in Figures III.A and III.B (the bold lines).




Intuitively, when θ is low enough, education is consumed only by few voters and hence it
is relatively cheap to provide it. This implies that the Pareto set does not contain policies
with t>0 and g =0because both factions can improve on such policies by lowering the tax
rate and providing some public education. In Figure III.B on the other hand the Pareto set
is on the boundaries of the policy space. This arises when θ is relatively high and education
becomes expensive to provide. In that case, the two factions cannot improve upon policies
with t>0 and g =0and the Pareto set includes for example the ideal policy of po, (1,0).







2, it is also the case that θ<
wh − w
wh − wl
. In other words, when θ<1
2, the
17 Technically, this arises when the indiﬀerence curve of the old rich (whose slope is
w−wh
θ ) is more
steep than the linear part of the indiﬀerence curve of the young poor (whose slope is
wl−w
1−θ ).
14Pareto set is interior as described in Figure III.A and the ideal policy of po is not in the
Pareto set of ropy. As a result, ro and py can ﬁnd policies in their Pareto set (that is, credible
policies), characterized by t<1 and g>0, which both prefer to (1,0). By reducing and
shifting tax revenues from a costly universal income redistribution to the public provision of
education, the party of ro and py increases the utility of py (who is in need of positive public
provision of education) as well as the income of ro. Figure IV describes these policies.
We can now put all the ingredients together. First, when θ<1
2, the party ropy can
win the election against po. It can oﬀer policies which receive the support of the groups it
represents as well as the support of ry, for whom (1,0) is the worst possible policy. Second,
we have established that when θ<1
2 and parties don’t form, then po wins the election.
Thus, ropy winning is also a stable political outcome: The party wins with policies that
provide each of its members a higher utility than the ideal policy of po. Consequently, both
party members would be worse oﬀ were they to split the party.
As I show in the formal proof, po c a n n o tb ei na n yw i n n i n gc o a l i t i o nb e c a u s eh eh a s
strong incentives to break his party, run alone and win the election. He therefore cannot
credibly commit to cooperate with other representatives. As a result, any coalition must
win against po; thus, any coalition must cater to the votes of the young poor and the old
rich, since if any of these votes with po, then po wins (other stable coalitions may therefore
be rypy and rorypy). This implies that all stable political outcomes have positive public
provision of education, i.e., g>0, a tax level which is not at its maximum, i.e., t<1
and possibly some positive level of net income transfer. With endogenous parties and a
minority of young voters, education is therefore provided even when income redistribution
is a possible policy tool.
W ec a nn o wm o v et ot h ec a s ei nw h i c hθ>1
2 and the young voters are a majority. In
this case, when parties don’t form, the “default” policy changes and it is py who wins the
election with the policy (1,g∗(1)). To see why, note that if the old vote all together they
cannot win against the young since they constitute a minority. By the same reasoning, if
all the rich vote together against the poor they cannot win. Thus, the representative of the
young poor emerges as the unique winner in the election.
To win against py, a coalition needs then the support of both ry and po (since if
each votes instead for py, then py wins). But also when θ>1
2, a large proportion of the
population consumes education. The provision of signiﬁcant levels of public education per
15capita becomes relatively expensive. The rich can then cooperate with the old poor in order
to reduce taxes and target the revenues to income redistribution instead of public education.
In particular, when θ>1
2, the Pareto set of ry and po does not include the ideal policy of





also depicts the (credible) policies of the rypo coalition which are better for both factions
relative to the ideal policy of py; these are the policies on their Pareto set which are bound
by the indiﬀerence curves of ry and po that go through (1,g∗(1)).
Thus, the party of the young rich and the old poor can win by advocating policies with
tax level that is less than the maximum, relatively high levels of income redistribution, and
no public provision of education. Against possible competition from py, the party’s policies
attract the votes of the groups it represents as well as the votes of the old rich. The party
is also stable since neither po nor ry prefers to split; in such a case py would win.19
Thus, when income redistribution is feasible, it becomes the dominant form of redistri-
bution when the young are a majority, at the expense of public education. The result here
(see Figure V) that the level of public provision of education goes down all the way to zero
should not be taken literally: it is an artifact of the simplifying assumption that the old do
not care at all about education. If the old would somewhat beneﬁt from education, public
education may be provided but still at a lower level (per capita) than when the young are
a minority.
To summarize, minorities are successful in the political process because both decisions
are taken simultaneously in equilibrium: the size of government and the use of its resources.
It allows for a “give and take” compromise within parties. In this intraparty compromise,
minorities overcome majoritarian interests; the minority segment of the poor agrees to
lower taxes and the rich in return agree to ﬁnance some level of the “cheaper” type of
redistribution.
III.B. Private Education
The political outcomes are translated back into private choices in the education market.
To understand how private education is aﬀected by the political process, consider ﬁrst the
case in which the old are a majority. Another glance at Figures III.A and IV allows us to




in this case the Pareto set contains only policies with g =0 .
19 Another possible stable coalition in this case is that of ropo.
16see that the political outcomes in this case are on the non-linear part of the indiﬀerence
curves of the young poor. This implies that for the young poor, s =0in equilibrium so
that they do not buy additional education in the private market. This has two implications.
First, in equilibrium the level of education provision may be ineﬃcient. The ineﬃciency
arises because agents cannot scale back on their education (i.e., I assume that s cannot be
negative) and because indeed in equilibrium this constraint is binding. Second, for some
parameters, s =0for the young rich as well. This means that the rich and the poor can be
equally educated since both settle for public education only.
On the other hand, when the old are a minority, there is a lower provision of public
education. This means that the young - both rich and poor - are more likely to buy private
education. Another feature of the equilibrium is that income inequality persists, i.e., that
the tax level is not at its maximum. Obviously then the rich invest more in education due
to larger resources, which implies that the rich are better educated than the poor. We
therefore have:
Proposition 2 The rich and the poor are more likely to be equally educated when
the young voters are a minority.
This may have interesting dynamic implications. If education is positively related to
future income, then a small cohort of young voters is more likely to lead to equality of
income in the long term (because the poor are more likely to be as educated as the rich
are) than a large cohort of young voters.20
III.C. The Eﬀects of Income Inequality




and income inequality is relatively high, then the young rich prefer no redistribution
at all or in other words, the young rich and the old rich have similar preferences. On the
other hand, when θ<
w
wh
, the young rich advocate public education and thus become more
similar in their preferences to the young poor. This, as shown below, has diﬀerent eﬀects
depending again on relative cohort sizes:
Proposition 3 When the old are a majority, higher income inequality may increase
tax rates and the level of public education. When the young are a majority, higher income
inequality may decrease tax rates.
20 I discuss additional dynamic issues in section IV.A.
17When the old are a majority, cohesiveness among the rich can aﬀect policies in two
ways. First, recall that any winning coalition would need to win against the old poor and
hence would need to attract the votes of both the old rich and the young poor (otherwise,
the old poor win the election). We have described one possible coalition that is always
stable, that of the old rich and the young poor themselves. When the preferences of the
rich groups are similar (or when income inequality is high) then a coalition of the young
rich and the young poor can also manage to attract all votes necessary to win the election
(in particular, the votes of the old rich). The policies of this “young” coalition will typically
be characterized by higher public provision of education, compared with those of the old
rich and the young poor. When income inequality is low on the other hand, the preferences
of the diﬀerent rich groups are more divergent and hence the “young” coalition is less likely
to attract the votes of the old rich and therefore less likely to win.
Second, since they have similar preferences, the two rich groups may compete with
one another too ﬁercely for the votes of the poor. Consider again the coalition of the old
rich and the young poor. This coalition may face a possible competition not only from the
old poor but also from the young rich who may run for election (oﬀering a policy of zero
taxation). The young rich would attract the votes of all the rich. If also the old poor would
vote for them, the young rich will win. Thus, the coalition of the old rich and young poor
must oﬀer relatively high tax rates and high income transfers in order to attract the old
poor voters and fend oﬀ competition from the young rich. On the other hand, when income
inequality is low and the young rich’s ideal policy advocates only public education and no
income redistribution, the young rich cannot attract the old poor voters. The coalition is
therefore ‘safe’ even by oﬀering relatively low taxes.
Importantly, higher income inequality has completely diﬀerent eﬀect on equilibrium
outcomes when the young are a majority. When the young are a majority, it is low income
inequality rather than high income inequality that can result in higher taxes. To see why,
consider a coalition composed of old representatives, rich and poor, who may attempt to
win the election with the policies described in Figure V (these policies are on the coalition’s
Pareto set). But low income inequality implies that the young rich become more attractive
to the young poor since the former are actually in favour of public education. Thus, when
income inequality is low, the “old” coalition has to overcome competition from the young
rich who can cater to the young poor and therefore the coalition must choose a policy with
18relatively high taxes and high income transfers (it cannot oﬀer any public education) in
order to win. When income inequality is high, the young rich cannot attract the votes of
the young poor since they advocate a policy of zero taxation.
A dynamic path of income inequality can be therefore non trivial in the context of this
model. High income inequality may lead to lower income inequality when the young are a
minority but to an even higher inequality when the young are a majority. Thus, whether,
starting from an unequal distribution of income would result in convergence of income or
in a further divergence may depend on demographic parameters such as the cohort size of
young voters.
IV. Discussion and Extensions
In this section I discuss the main assumptions of the model. This illustrates the ro-
bustness of the results and also suggests some possible extensions.
IV.A. Dynamics
Although the model is static it can still capture many features of dynamic environ-
ments. An important feature of education in a dynamic environment is that costly invest-
ment in education at present may yield beneﬁts only in the future. In the model I assume a
general enough utility function for young voters, which can capture the fact that young vot-
ers enjoy present income as well as future income, which can then be an increasing function
of investment in education.
Apart from capturing the dynamic features of education in a reduced form manner
in the utility function, dynamic considerations may also aﬀect the political process. The
results of the model can be robust to such an extension. Suppose that indeed there are two
periods and that the political process repeats itself at each period (with the demographic
features of the population possibly evolving). In such a model, society determines tax and
education policies in period 1, while these do not commit the period 2 population who then
determines its own tax and education policies. In this case, as long as the poor believe that
as a group they are likely to remain more than half of the population despite some of them
investing in education, then the model’s results are maintained since voting incentives in
period 1 are the same as in the model. The reason is that at period 2 any voter is better oﬀ
being rich, disregarding the particular equilibrium outcome. Thus young voters who will
19become old at period 2 still want at period 1 to trade-oﬀ income for education.
An alternative environment is one in which there is political commitment across periods
so that the same taxing and spending decisions in period 1 are re-instated in period 2. In
such a case a young voter must take into consideration in period 1 the eﬀect of tax also
on her future income in period 2, when she turns old (and possibly rich, if she invests
in education). Voting incentives can still be maintained as in my analysis but this would
demand imposing more assumptions on the utility function of the young mainly in order to
maintain single-peaked preferences and equilibrium existence.
IV.B. Old, Young and Preferences over Public Education
Several assumptions created a stark distinction between the old and the young in the
model, or more generally between the two groups who have diﬀerent attitudes towards
education. Most of these assumptions were made to facilitate the analysis but are not
crucial. First, I have assumed that the old do not beneﬁt at all from education; the results
can be modiﬁed if we allow the old to care somewhat about education (but less than the
young do).
Second, I have assumed that only the young consume education. All the results hold
if the old consume suﬃciently low levels of publicly provided education. To see that, note
that the share of those in the population who consume education determines how costly it
is to provide it. When the young are a majority, allowing the old to consume education
would just reinforce the results since public education is already perceived by the rich as
too expensive. When the old are a majority the results are sustained as long as public
education is not too costly, so that the young rich and the old poor could credibly oﬀer it
in equilibrium. This happens either when the old do not consume too much education, or
otherwise when either the share of the poor is relatively large, or when income inequality
is relatively low.
Third, the utility function of the old is assumed to be linear is income or in the
consumption of the numeraire good; this is not important and alternatively, one can assume
that their utility is concave. Similarly, the utility function of the young is assumed to be
concave in the consumption of education as well as in the consumption of the numeraire
good. An alternative assumption is that their utility function is linear and public education
is simply an income transfer from the old to the young. The model can be modiﬁed to
20maintain the results in this case.
Finally, it is important in the model that society is divided according to agents’ atti-
tudes towards education. In the extreme cases of homogenous societies, when θ =0(all are
old) or when θ =1(all are young), there is only one dimension of conﬂict. It is then easy
to see that in such cases the stable political outcome is majoritarian and coincides with the
ideal policy of the poor.21 This illustrates the importance of analyzing a model with more
than one dimension of conﬂict, in which diﬀerent groups in society ‘trade’ with one another
to produce non-majoritarian outcomes.22
IV.C. Political Institutions and Electoral Rules
To simplify the political model, the analysis was focused on the electoral system of
plurality rule. Some electoral systems are indeed majoritarian and can be approximated by
plurality rule. Adapting the model for other electoral systems and forms of government is
clearly an important avenue for future research.
Let us consider for example an electoral rule of proportional representation (PR).
In PR systems, the political outcome is a weighted average of the policies oﬀered in the
election (the weights would depend on the parties’ vote shares as well as on the process
of government formation). As a result, the probability of each party aﬀecting the political
outcome is not 0 or 1 as in the majoritarian system described in this paper, but is smoother.
A reasonable conjecture in such a case is that more parties would run for election and that
the political outcome would represent a larger share of the population. This may imply
that the equilibrium outcomes will be less stark compared with the current model. Thus,
a possible test of the model is in the context of a cross-country analysis. By exploiting the
variation of electoral rules we can test whether indeed the eﬀects described in this paper
are stronger in countries with majoritarian systems than in countries with PR.23
21 This can also be generalized for societies with more than two levels of income. The general result
would then be that if the median income is less than the mean, there is maximum taxation, whereas if the
median income is higher than the mean, there would be no taxation at all. Such results accord with previous
literature on redistribution, notably Roberts [1977]
22 The fact that outcomes are majoritarian at the extreme cases of θ =0and θ =1implies that
political outcomes exhibit discontinuity when θ → 1 or θ → 0. Such discontinuities are reasonable. They
arise because when a group of voters increases its share in the population from 0 to a positive share, it
becomes represented in the political process and gains political power.
23 Research in comparative political institutions has shown that typically proportional representation
21V. Conclusion
In this paper I have shown how, when income redistribution is feasible as well, a
negative cohort size eﬀect arises with respect to public provision of education. When the
young are a minority then the poor segment of the young forms a winning coalition with
the rich. Such coalition provides public education. When the old are a minority on the
other hand, it is the old poor who form a coaliti o nw i t ht h er i c ha n dt h i sc o a l i t i o np r o v i d e s
income transfers instead. In any case, since the rich are always represented in the winning
coalition, the poor do not fully expropriate the rich. These results imply that the poor and
the rich are more likely to be equally educated when the young are a minority. I have also
shown that income inequality may have diﬀerent eﬀects on tax rates and public provision
of education, depending on its interaction with demographic parameters.
The results arise due to a combination of economic and political factors; the economic
factor links the size of the cohort of young voters to the relative costs of the two diﬀerent
types of redistribution - the targeted (education) and the universal (income redistribution).
The political factor on the other hand determines how easy it is for a group, given its size
and hence the relative cost of the redistribution it advocates, to make political compromises
when forming parties with other groups.
In terms of empirical work, it may be fruitful to conduct an analysis which looks
simultaneously at the composition of parties or coalitions, the level of income redistribution
or the welfare state, the level of public provision of education as well as the consumption
of private education. Finally, although the paper focuses on education, the analysis may
apply to other private goods which are publicly supplied or also to local public goods. It
might therefore be useful to continue in this direction and investigate, theoretically and
empirically, how the results of the model extend when the minority groups in the economy
advocate other speciﬁc private goods or local public goods.
Appendix
A. Deﬁnition of δ0 and µ0 :
systems have larger governments and larger welfare states than majoritarian system countries (where welfare
can be interpreted as income redistribution in the model). For theoretical and empirical analysis of the
economic eﬀects of diﬀerent electoral systems see Persson and Tabellini [2000, 2003].
22Denote the Pareto set of ropy when it is interior as ˜ Qropy. Deﬁne (t0,g0) ∈ ˜ Qropy as the
policy that makes ro indiﬀerent to the ideal policy of po, i.e., vro(t0,g0)=vro(1,0). Similarly,
let (t00,0) ∈ ˜ Qropo be deﬁned by vry(t00,0) = vry(1,g∗(1)). It h e nd e ﬁne:
δ0 ≡ vpo(1,g∗(1)) − vpo(t0,g0),µ 0 ≡ vpy(1,0) − vpy(t00,0).
Note that µ0 > 0. I also assume that δ0 > 0.
B. Full Characterization of Stable Political Outcomes:
Lemma 2 With endogenous parties:24
(i) When θ<1
2 :
-The partition ropy|ry|po is stable for all parameters with the party ropy winning with
policies in its Pareto set which ro and py prefer to (1,0). These policies have g>0 and
t<1 and are worse for po than the ideal policy of py. If θ>
w
wh
, these policies are also
preferred by po to (0,0).




with rypy winning the election with policies in its Pareto set which ro and py prefer to (1,0),
and are thus characterized by g>0 and t<1. These policies have higher level of g than
the winning policies of the party ropy.
-The partition ropyry|po is stable when θ>
w
wh
, with the party ropyry winning with
policies in its Pareto set which ro and py prefer to (1,0), and thus satisfy g>0 and t<1.
These policies are also worse for po than (0,0).
(ii) When θ>1
2 :
-The partition rypo|ro|py is stable for all parameters with the party rypo winning with
policies in its Pareto set which ry and po prefer to the ideal policy of py. These policies have
g =0and 0 <t<1.
-The partition ropo|ry|py is stable for all parameters with the party ropo winning with
policies in its Pareto set which ry and po prefer to the ideal policy of py. These policies have
g =0and 0 <t<1. If θ<
w
wh
, these policies are such that py prefers them to the ideal
policy of ry.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS.
24 For the proof, see Levy [2005].
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Figure IV
The indiﬀerence curve of ro (the dashed line) that goes through the ideal policy of po,
(1,0), and that of py that goes through (1,0), deﬁne the set of policies on the Pareto set of
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